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Abstract 
Given an acceptable level of military performance, arguably the two most 
important criteria for weapon systems performance are readiness (operational 
availability, or Ao) and life cycle cost (LCC).  These two criteria are in conflict: one 
may maximize Ao by increasing LCC or minimize LCC by degrading Ao.  In this 
paper, we develop a model to analyze risk factors associated with this bi-criterion 
problem. To analyze the impact of input factors on risk, or variance in the outcome 
criteria, we conduct Monte Carlo simulation. We then apply design of experiments 
methodologies to identify risk factors by analyzing quantiles of these criteria in which 
we examine the probability that cost will exceed a certain threshold dollar amount 
and the probability that readiness falls below a certain threshold. 
Keywords: weapon systems performance, readiness, life cycle cost, risk 
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I. Introduction 
The life cycle cost (LCC) of a weapon system is the cost of acquiring, 
operating, and supporting that weapon system.  The careful management of LCC 
will be increasingly important as defense budgets come under pressure in the next 
few years because of the U.S. Federal Government debt and deficit.  There is a 
trade-off between LCC and deployed performance of a weapon system because 
investments in support -- e.g., spare inventory, repair capacity, etc. are expensive.  
Since these expenditures are to some degree discretionary, program managers will 
be under increasing pressure to reduce deployed support investments. The intent of 
such pressure will be to reduce waste, not to reduce performance.  But program 
managers need a tool that can clearly show the trade-offs between cost and 
performance in order to demonstrate the performance impact of cost-cutting 
measures and to avoid cutting more deeply into performance than they intend. 
However, it is difficult to accurately track the LCC of a single weapon system 
because so many support facilities (e.g., repair, training) are shared and support 
several weapon systems, and many costs are relatively fixed.  The model we 
present in this paper tracks the LCC of multiple operating units of a weapon system 
(e.g., multiple squadrons of aircraft). The cost model incorporates start-up (fixed) 
costs such as acquisition and maintenance facilities, as well as spare inventory 
pools for major components.  Operations and maintenance costs, personnel and 
training costs, as well as disposal costs are also included in the model.    
Investment and operating expenses are related to operational availability (Ao) 
through a stochastic model that considers variability in operational tempo (Op-
tempo), operating and maintenance costs, component reliability, and maintenance 
downtime.  The model, which relates costs to performance, incorporates congestion 
effects and the impact of delays due to an insufficient investment in capacity.  For 
example, a smaller investment in spare parts inventory may lead to reductions in Ao 
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We use our model to analyze the trade-offs between LCC and Ao across a 
range of input factors that represent differences between (1) acquisition program 
approaches, (2) depot maintenance characteristics, and (3) squadron operations.  
Some factors are under the control of decision-makers, such as spare inventory 
levels, while others are exogenous, such as the price of petroleum, oil, and lubricant 
(POL).  The intent of including exogenous factors is to give an idea of the degree of 
leverage a decision-maker may have in affecting LCC or Ao, given the impact of 
variables beyond his or her control. 
Input factors that are varied include the mean time between failures (MTBF) 
of major components, Op-tempo, POL cost, depot repair turnaround time (DTAT), 
and preventive maintenance (for depot overhaul) turnaround time (PMTAT). Each of 
these factors is varied over several levels, creating an analysis problem too large for 
a full-factorial experiment.  Instead, we used a Nearly-Orthogonal Latin Hypercube 
(NOLH) design, which allows a detailed, if not exhaustive, analysis of the way these 
input variables impact the outcome criteria. 
In many cases, decision-makers involved in planning and operations for a 
weapon system are concerned about more than just average LCC or average Ao, 
but in addition, they want to understand the impact of variability in costs and 
performance.  For example, a decision-maker may wish to know the probability that 
LCC exceeds a given budget (which we call budget risk [BR]) or the probability that 
Ao falls below a certain planning threshold (which we call readiness risk [RR]; Kang, 
Doerr, & Sanchez, 2006; Kang, Doerr, Apte, & Boudreau, 2010). To analyze the 
impact of variance in the input factors on risk, we conducted post hoc analyses using 
Monte Carlo simulation.   
To perform the post hoc analyses, we conducted a factorial experiment on 
three key factors, which the main analysis indicated had an impact on mean 
outcomes but which are also under the control of decision-makers.  Results of the 
post hoc analyses showed the impact that factors under the control of decision-
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II. Case Study 
We have developed a hypothetical case involving fighter aircraft, the F-XX, 
and its acquisition, operation, and maintenance and have created a companion 
spreadsheet model to estimate the LCC and Ao.  We briefly describe the case in the 
next section. More details of this F-XX case study are described in Kang and Doerr 
(2012).    
A. The Case and the Spreadsheet Model 
A total of 96 new fighter aircraft, F-XX, will be acquired and divided into eight 
squadrons.  The F-XX program life cycle is estimated to be 30 years. The manning 
requirements are as follows:   
 Pilots and Ground Support Personnel (per squadron) 
 17 Pilots 
   4  Ground Support Officers 
 16 Non-commissioned Officers (NCOs) 
 176 Enlisted 
Headquarters Personnel 
   2 One Commanding Officer (CO) and one Executive Officer (XO)  
(both are pilots) 
   1 Administration Officer (non-pilot) 
   2 NCOs 
   4 Enlisted 
The personnel costs are based on the DoD standard composite pay that 
includes standard benefits (housing, food, medical, etc., not including re-enlistment 
bonuses, combat pay, etc.).  (See http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
comptroller/rates/fy2013/ 2013_k.pdf.)  All F-XX personnel will require both basic 
and advanced levels of training. The manpower annual turnover rate is estimated to 
be 20%, and additional personnel must be trained due to attrition.  The cost for non-
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training is estimated to be $3,000 per week per person.  Pilot training costs $11,000 
per week per person for both basic and advanced training.  Required training times 
for pilots and ground maintenance personnel and headquarters personnel are as 
follows: 
Pilots and Ground Personnel Training Requirements 
Basic Advanced 
Officer 
Pilot 36 weeks 12 weeks 
Ground 12 weeks 2 weeks 
NCO  12 weeks 2 weeks 
Enlisted 24 weeks 24 weeks 
Headquarters Personnel Training Requirements 
Basic Admin Training (Officers, NCOs, enlisted): 10 weeks 
Advanced Admin Training (Officers and NCOs):  3 weeks 
Management of spare parts will be on a one-for-one exchange at the 
squadron level (organizational level, or O-level).  It takes one day to swap the failed 
component with a spare part, if the part is available.  Otherwise, the aircraft will be 
grounded until a ready-for-issue (RFI) spare part becomes available.  An average 
waiting time for an RFI spare part is assumed to be 50% of the depot repair 
turnaround time.  A failed component is sent to the contractor-managed depot for 
repair.  The depot turnaround time is estimated to be 40 days.  Each aircraft will go 
through preventive maintenance (overhaul) every five years, which takes an average 
of three months.  
Each squadron’s activity has start-up fixed costs, which are incurred at 
$10,000,000 per activity prior to squadron activation.  Additionally, operating variable 
costs, which are estimated at $5,000,000 per year per O-level activity, are incurred 
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In this study, we consider the six major components shown in Table 1. The 
MTBFs and the unit costs for the components are included in the table.  To make the 
model more realistic, we may need to add some more components, yet not too 
many. As shown in Kang and McDonald (2010) in the case of light armored vehicles, 
generally in any major weapon system, a small number of components contribute to 
majority of the parts cost.   
Table 1. The MTBF and the Unit Cost of the Six Major Components  
Component Name MTBF Unit Cost 
Auxiliary Power Unit 250 $100,000 
Generator 400 $ 250,000 
Radar 1000 $ 400,000 
Avionic Computer 1000 $ 500,000 
Landing Gear 500 $ 400,000 
Engine 500 $ 2,000,000
 
Each aircraft is expected to fly an average of 40 hours per month, and the 
cost for POL is estimated to be $2,000 per flying hour. Each copy of the F-XX has an 
average unit cost of $50 million. Support equipment costs are $20,000 per aircraft.  
These one-time costs are incurred when the F-XXs are phased into the squadrons.  
The expected salvage value of each aircraft at the end of the life cycle is estimated 
to be $5 million, which is 10% of the procurement unit cost.  An annual capital 
discount rate of 2% is used to compute the present value of the LCC. (See 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a094/a094.html for guidance for the capital 
discount rate.) 
We have developed a spreadsheet model to compute the life cycle cost and 
the Ao of this F-XX case.  A sample screenshot of the user-interface page of the 
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Figure 1. A Sample Screenshot of the F-XX Life Cycle Cost and  
Readiness Spreadsheet User-Interface Page 
B. The Significant Factors 
We considered the six major components (auxiliary power unit [APU], engine, 
landing gear, avionic computer, radar, and generator) shown in Table 1.  When any 
of these components fails, the faulty part is removed from the aircraft, a spare is 
installed, and the faulty part is sent to the repair facility.  After the repair is complete, 
the repaired part becomes a spare and is sent to the spare pool.  When a critical 
part fails and a spare is not available, the aircraft will be non-operational and 
grounded until a spare becomes available. The components listed in Table 1, with 
the exception of the APU, are considered critical.    
We have chosen the following 11 factors to identify significant factors for the 
readiness and life cycle cost of the program:    
 MTBFs: six components’ mean time between failures (or reliabilities), 
 CPL: critical protection level for spare parts (fill rate or service level), 
 FLHRS: monthly flight hours (operational tempo), 
 POL: cost of POL,  
 DTAT: depot corrective maintenance turnaround time, and 
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We used an NOLH with 257 runs (Cioppa & Lucas, 2007).  This design is 
capable of handling up to 29 factors without increasing the number of scenarios 
(Kleijnen, Sanchez, Lucas, & Cioppa, 2005; Sanchez, 2006). We have developed a 
macro written in Visual Basic that computes the life cycle cost and the operational 
availability for each scenario.   
We fit regression meta-models of the life cycle cost as a function of the 11 
main effects, and two-way interaction of the 11 input factors, using the JMP® 
software package (SAS Institute, 2008).  After noticing the impact on several non-
significant factors, we picked five significant factors for further analysis: CPL, ENG 
(MTBF of engine), POL, FLHRS, and DTAT.  Then we fit regression meta-models of 
the LCC as a function of these five main effects and two-way interaction of these five 
input factors.  The results are shown in Figure 2.   
 
Figure 2. Sorted Parameter Estimates from JMP Analysis for Life  
Cycle Cost 
As shown in Figure 2, CPL, FLHRS, and the POL cost are the major factors 
that affect the LCC.  Also, the two-way interaction between FLHRS and POL has 
significant impact on the LCC.  It is intuitively correct since as the POL cost and the 
flight hours increase at the same time; there is an accelerated impact on the 
increase of the life cycle cost.  DTAT and ENG, and other two-way interaction 
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We also conducted the same regression meta-model analysis for Ao.  PMTAT 
is by far the most significant factor, with FLHRS and DTAT also statistically 
significant. 
The previous analyses helped to identify the critical factors for controlling the 
LCC and Ao across the range of significant inputs we varied.  The bi-criterion 
problem faced by a decision-maker is to use the information provided by a model 
similar to ours to reduce LCC, without causing an unintentionally severe impact on 
Ao. Rather than looking across all factors as they vary, the decision-maker faces a 
particular scenario and must make decisions about whether, and how much, to vary 
a particular parameter.  To provide an idea of how our model might be used to assist 
in such a decision, we took DTAT, a factor identified as important for both LCC and 
Ao, and varied it across its range of likely values for a particular scenario (in this 
case, the mean values of all other input factors).  Results are shown in Figure 3.  
Note that while Ao is linearly decreasing in DTAT, LCC is not linearly increasing.  
There are levels of increase in DTAT that would provide no significant cost reduction 
but would degrade performance.  
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III. Risk Analysis 
Risk analysis focuses not upon the main outcomes of the expected LCC and 
Ao, but rather on the potential variability in those two metrics.  Variability is important 
to assess for at least two reasons.  First, the expected outcome may not be a 
reliable predictor.  This is especially true of LCC.  Program managers may be more 
interested in the probability that they will exceed their budget than the fact that the 
budget will be sufficient “on average.”  Second, the average outcome may not be 
especially relevant to operations.  This is especially true of Ao since operations are 
planned assuming a particular level of readiness.  Operational commanders may be 
more interested in knowing the probability that they will be able to execute a plan on 
a particular day rather than whether they would be able to execute the plan on 
average.  
There are several potential risk metrics available to assess variability in Ao 
and LCC.  We have selected two metrics relevant to the issues raised in the last 
paragraph.  What we call budget risk (BR) is the percentage chance that LCC will 
exceed a given (cumulative) dollar budget.  Readiness risk (RR) is the percentage 
chance that Ao will fail to achieve a given availability target. 
The analysis of main outcomes indicated that cost—and, to a lesser extent, 
readiness—are determined in part by factors beyond the operational control of a 
program manager.  POL and FLHRS (or Op-tempo) are both beyond his control, and 
except for expensive engineering change orders, improvements to engine MBTF are 
difficult to achieve, especially after a system is deployed. The risk analysis reported 
here investigated factors more easily controlled by a program manager. We intended 
to demonstrate that significant reductions in budget and operational risk can be 
obtained by manipulation of factors directly under the control of a program manager 
(even late in the life cycle of a weapon system—although our cost figures always 
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of changes in PMTAT, DTAT, and CPL on the risk of exceeding a $20 billion budget 
($20b-BR) and the risk of failing to achieve an Ao of 85% (85%-RR).  
We varied our three independent variables in three levels in a 3x3x3 factorial 
design of experiments.  At each level, the independent variable was modeled by a 
random variable.  For DTAT, the three levels represented short, medium, and long 
turnaround times and were distributed by triangular distributions of the following (in 
days): T(10,20,40), T(20,40,80), and T(40,80,160).  All three of these distributions 
had a coefficient of variation (CV) of 0.27.  For PMTAT, the short, medium, and long 
turnaround times were distributed by uniform distributions of the following (in days): 
U(15, 105), U(22.5, 157.5), and U(37.5, 262.5).  All three of these distributions had a 
CV of 0.43.  For CPL, the three levels represented very high, high, and moderate fill 
rates and were distributed according to uniform distributions (in percentage) of the 
following: U(96.6, 99.5), U(91.25, 98.75), and U(80.75, 97.25).  These distributions 
had a CV of 0.009, 0.023, and 0.054 (respectively), meaning that higher protection 
levels were also less variable.   
Note that the levels selected for the independent variables are arbitrary and 
neither informed by historical data nor restricted carefully to provide a systematic 
analysis of the relationship between the independent variables and the outcomes.  
Therefore, the implications that can be drawn from our analysis are limited.  
However, our goal was merely to demonstrate (1) an approach to risk analysis, and 
(2) the impact that factors that can be changed by a program manager (even late in 
a program) can have on important program risks.  
Marginal probabilities are reported in Table 2.  Each cell in this table is the 
average across the 3x3=9 conditions of the other two factors.  Results showed that 
readiness risk increases in PMTAT and DTAT and decreases in CPL.  Budget risk 
increases in DTAT and decreases in CPL, although only modestly (spare parts are a 
small part of the overall budget).  Budget risk is relatively unaffected by changes in 
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computing LCC; the main impact of increasing PMTAT is that the weapon system is 
unavailable for longer periods. 
It is worth noting that the magnitude of some of the reported changes was 
substantial.  A 9% decrease in CPL (from 98% to 89%) resulted in a 23% decrease 
in readiness risk (from 31% to 8%).  A 60% decrease in PMTAT (from an average of 
112.5 days to an average of 45 days) resulted in a six-fold decrease in readiness 
risk (from 37% to 6%).  On the other hand, only DTAT significantly reduced budget 
risk.  A 75% decrease in DTAT (from an average of 80 days to an average of 20 
days) reduced budget risk by half (from 16% to 8%).   
Table 2. Marginal Probabilities of Readiness Risk and Budget Risk 
Marginal Probabilities 













Low 6% 12% 9% 8% 31% 10% 
Med 10% 12% 15% 11% 14% 12% 
High 37% 11% 29% 16% 8% 13% 
 
To examine interaction, we varied two factors at a time and examined the 
response surface of the marginal probabilities (marginal across the third factor) of 
each outcome.  This gave us six potential graphs to draw.  However, we omit the 
graphs involving budget risk and PMTAT because PMTAT has little impact on 
budget risk.  Figure 4 shows readiness risk as a function of PMTAT and DTAT.  As 
expected from the marginal results, readiness risk rises sharply as both turnaround 
times jointly increase.  However, the function is clearly not monotonic, and there is a 
clear saddle point below the joint minimum, indicating that past a point, reductions in 
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Figure 4. Readiness Risk as a Function of PMTAT and DTAT 
Figure 5 shows readiness risk as a function of DTAT and CPL.  Although less 
complex, the pattern is the same as that of Figure 4: a sharp non-linear increase in 
readiness risk as DTAT and CPL are jointly degraded (by increasing DTAT and 
decreasing CPL), a non-monotonic response surface, and diminishing marginal 
returns.  
The graph of readiness risk as a function of PMTAT and CPL is similar to 
Figures 4 and 5 and is omitted.  Instead, we present a contour plot (Figure 6) that 
clarifies something that the surface plots also suggest: that there are multiple ways 
to obtain a given level of readiness risk (as in the surface charts, intermediate points 
are interpolated).  For example, one can obtain readiness risk as low as 15%, even 
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Figure 5. Readiness Risk as a Function of CPL and DTAT 
Finally, Figure 7 presents a graph of budget risk as a function of DTAT and 
CPL.  Although it is also non-linear and non-monotonic, it is clear from the graph that 
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Figure 6. Readiness Risk as a Function of CPL and PMTAT 
 
















10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
PMTAT













do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 15 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
IV. Summary 
In summary, we first presented a methodology to identify significant factors 
that affect readiness and life cycle cost for a weapon system, using a fighter aircraft 
program as an example.  We then demonstrated a method of examining the joint 
impact of maintenance and sparing on readiness and budget risk.  The impact is 
interactive, and highly non-linear.  We have also shown that while factors beyond the 
control of a program manager, such as POL and FLHRS, may be critical factors in 
(average) Ao and life cycle cost, factors within the control of a program manager 



















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 17 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
List of References 
Cioppa, T. M., & Lucas, T. W. (2007). Efficient nearly orthogonal and space-filling 
Latin hypercubes. Technometrics, 45, 45–55. 
Kang, K., & Doerr, K. (2012). Case study: Readiness and total ownership cost 
analyses for new fighter aircraft, F-XX (Technical Report GSBPP-12-212). 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.  
Kang, K., Doerr, K., Apte, U., & Boudreau, M. (2010). Decision support models for 
valuing improvements in component reliability and maintenance. Military 
Operations Research, 15(4), 55–68.  
Kang, K., Doerr, K. H., & Sanchez, S. M. (2006). A design of experiments approach 
for readiness risk analysis. In L. F. Perrone, F. P. Wieland, J. Liu, B. G. 
Lawson, D. M. Nicol, & R. M. Fujimoto (Eds.), Proceedings of the 2006 Winter 
Simulation Conference. Piscataway, NJ: Institute of Electrical and Electronic 
Engineers.  
Kang, K., & McDonald, M. (2010). Impact of logistics on readiness and life cycle 
cost: A design of experiment approach. In Proceedings of the 2010 Winter 
Simulation Conference. Piscataway, NJ: Institute of Electrical and Electronic 
Engineers.  
Kleijnen, J. P. C., Sanchez, S. M., Lucas, T. W., & Cioppa, T. M. (2005). A user’s 
guide to the brave new world of designing simulation experiments. INFORMS 
Journal on Computing, 17(3), 263–289. 
Crystal Ball [Computer software]. Retrieved from http://www.oracle.com 
Sanchez, S. M. (2006). Work smarter, not harder: Guidelines for designing 
simulation experiments. In L. F. Perrone, F. P. Wieland, J. Liu, B. G. Lawson, 
D. M. Nicol, & R. M. Fujimoto (Eds.), Proceedings of the 2006 Winter 
Simulation Conference. Piscataway, NJ: Institute of Electrical and Electronic 
Engineers.  



















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= =  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
2003 - 2012 Sponsored Research Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
 Defense Industry Consolidation 
 EU-US Defense Industrial Relationships 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to 
Shipyard Planning Processes  
 Managing the Services Supply Chain 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 Private Military Sector 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Spiral Development 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 The Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository 
Contract Management 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Contracting Government Procurement Functions 
 Contractors in 21st-century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting, Planning and Execution 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 Strategic Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 USAF Energy Savings Performance Contracts 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 
 USMC Contingency Contracting 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= =  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Financial Management 
 Acquisitions via Leasing: MPS case 
 Budget Scoring 
 Budgeting for Capabilities-based Planning 
 Capital Budgeting for the DoD 
 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 
 Lessons from Private Sector Capital Budgeting for DoD Acquisition 
Budgeting Reform 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 ROI of Information Warfare Systems 
 Special Termination Liability in MDAPs 
 Strategic Sourcing 
 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to Improve Cost Estimates 
Human Resources 
 Indefinite Reenlistment 
 Individual Augmentation 
 Learning Management Systems 
 Moral Conduct Waivers and First-term Attrition 
 Retention 
 The Navy’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Management System 
 Tuition Assistance 
Logistics Management 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Army LOG MOD 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Cold-chain Logistics 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 
 Evolutionary Acquisition 
 Lean Six Sigma to Reduce Costs and Improve Readiness 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= =  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 Naval Aviation Maintenance and Process Improvement (2) 
 Optimizing CIWS Lifecycle Support (LCS) 
 Outsourcing the Pearl Harbor MK-48 Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity  
 Pallet Management System 
 PBL (4) 
 Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI 
 RFID (6) 
 Risk Analysis for Performance-based Logistics 
 R-TOC AEGIS Microwave Power Tubes 
 Sense-and-Respond Logistics Network 
 Strategic Sourcing 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module 
Acquisition 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 Contractor vs. Organic Support 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to AEGIS and SSDS 
 Managing the Service Supply Chain 
 Measuring Uncertainty in Earned Value 
 Organizational Modeling and Simulation 
 Public-Private Partnership 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Utilizing Collaborative and Three-dimensional Imaging Technology 
 
A complete listing and electronic copies of published research are available on our 
website: www.acquisitionresearch.net 



















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
  
 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó=
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
RRR=avbo=ol^aI=fkdboplii=e^ii=
jlkqbobvI=`^ifclokf^=VPVQP=
www.acquisitionresearch.net 
